cartiHS; quasi principia naturae activa eflfectus suos eo niodo producerent, quo nos opera nostra arti-ficialia solemus:" That in the works of nature .there is neither prudence nor understanding, but only it seems so to our apprehensions, who judge of these Divine things of nature according to our own arts and faculties, and patterns borrowed[s] from ourselves; as if the active principles of nature did produce their effects in the same manner as we do our artificial works.—Wherefore we conclude, agreeably to the sense of the best philosophers, both ancient and modern, that nature is such a thing, as, though it act artificially, and for the sake of ends, yet it doth but ape and miinid the Divine art and wisdom, itself not understands ing those ends which it acts for, nor the reason of what it doth in order to them; for which .cause also it is not capable of consultation or deliberation, nor can it act electively, or with discretion^ 13. But because this may seem strange at the first sight, that nature should be said to act Wd rou, for the sake of ends,—and regularly or artificially, and yet be itself devoid of knowledge and understanding, we shall therefore endeavour to persuade the possibility, and facilitate the belief of it, by some other instances; and first by that of habits, particularly those musical ones of singing*, playing upon instruments, and dancing. Which habits direct every motion of the hand, voice, and body, and prompt them readily, without any deliberation orstudied consideration, what the next, following note or motion should be. If you jog a sleeping musician, and sing but the first words of a song to him, which he had either himself com> posed, or learned before, he will presently take it